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Clean Power and Chevron: Scoring the Fight for Obama’s Climate Change Rule
Leo Capoferri1
I.

Introduction

When the EPA proposed the Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) in June 2014, the response was
mixed. Proponents viewed it as a sensible and realistic means of reducing CO2 emissions
produced by the energy sector.2 Many however, were skeptical. Opponents of the rule argue
that it relies on a rarely used section of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) to justify a radical expansion
of EPA authority.3 Several states and industry participants have challenged both the proposed
and final rule, 4 and the Supreme Court recently took the unprecedented step of granting an
immediate stay pending litigation.5
The stakes are high for the EPA and the Obama administration. Facing recalcitrant
opposition from a Republican-controlled Congress, President Obama promised executive action
on climate change,6 and directed the EPA to limit CO2 emissions from existing power plants.7
Given the remaining uncertainties and ongoing denial of the scientific underpinnings of
1

J.D. Candidate, 2017 Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. 2013 The College of New Jersey. Special Thanks
to Professor Jordan Paradise for her guidance in writing this Comment.
2
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anthropogenic climate change, executive action has the potential to alter the debate on mitigation
policies, forcing the opposition to challenge the extent of carbon reduction rather than the policy
itself.8 In addition, successful carbon mitigation policies bolster the United States’ credibility on
the international stage as it continues to assume a leadership role in transnational efforts to
address global warming.9 Indeed, many speculated whether the Supreme Court’s decision to
stay the rule would undermine the historic Paris Agreement on climate change.10
The CPP aims to reduce CO2 emissions from existing power plants by 32 percent from
their 2005 levels by 2030.11 To achieve this goal, the CPP sets state-specific emissions standards
tailored to each state’s present energy mix.12 The EPA calculated these standards to reflect the
reductions that are achievable through the implementation of three “building blocks,” each of
which describes a particular method of reducing CO2 emissions that the EPA has deemed
feasible and cost-effective. 13 The building blocks provide for emissions reductions through
increased efficiency, or heat rate improvements, (building block 1) and the substitution of
cleaner sources—natural gas and renewables such as wind and solar—for coal (building blocks 2
and 3).14 Each state is responsible for devising and implementing a plan for meeting the CPP’s

See Charlie Rose: President Obama’s Clean Power Plan with Gina McCarthy, Head of the Environmental
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emissions standards, subject to EPA approval. 15 If states fail to submit a plan, the EPA is
authorized to substitute its own, which the states are obligated to implement.16
The CPP has broad implications for the energy sector. Due to the nature of GHGs,
meaningful emissions reductions cannot be achieved cost-effectively by measures implemented
at each facility. 17 The EPA attempts to solve this problem by identifying reductions that are
achievable across the entire energy grid, and not merely as a result of improvements to individual
power plants. Consequently, building blocks 2 and 3 are emissions reduction measures that
require actions “beyond the fenceline,” i.e. outside the physical boundaries of an affected power
plant. In order to meet emissions rates set by the CPP, owners and operators will be forced to
reduce generation from coal-fired facilities and substitute generation from natural gas and
renewable sources.18 The EPA estimates that the rule will reduce coal-fired generation by nearly
50% from current levels.19 Consequently, the CPP will restructure the nation’s energy supply,
blurring the line between pollution reduction and energy regulation.
In addition to the CPP’s negative implications for the coal industry, the required
emissions reductions are considerably more stringent for some states compared with others,
depending on the extent of their reliance on coal-fired power. 20 For these reasons, the CPP has
inspired vigorous opposition from states and industry. Currently, twenty-seven states and
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“countless” industry participants are currently challenging the rule. 21 Opponents of the CPP
consistently rely on two arguments.22 First, they argue that a drafting error—caused when two
separate versions of § 111(d), one drafted by the House and one drafted by the Senate, were
included in the 1990 amendments to the CAA—should be resolved to preclude regulation of
CO2 from existing power plants.23 Second, opponents argue that the EPA lacks the authority to
regulate beyond the fenceline. 24 Because the EPA relies on § 111(d) as the source of its
authority for the CPP, the first argument creates a threshold issue that a reviewing court will
likely be forced to resolve. The second argument is important because it encapsulates a powerful
narrative that the EPA’s critics have employed, which describes the CPP as a sweeping and
unprecedented expansion of the agency’s authority. 25 Taken together, both arguments raise
issues of first impression and will likely comprise the heart of the legal challenge to the CPP.

21
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by 29 States and State Agencies for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action During Pendency of Petitions for
Review at 7-8, No. 15A773 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016) [hereinafter States’ Stay Application]; Application of Utility and
Allied Parties for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action Pending Appellate Review at 11, No. 15A776 (U.S. Jan.
27, 2016) [hereinafter Utilities’ Stay Application]; Final Opening Brief of Petitioner at 15, In re Murray Energy
Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-1112, 14-1151) [hereinafter Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief]; Eric
Groten, Here Be Dragons: Legal Threats to EPA’s Proposed Existing Source Performance Standards for Electric
Generating Units, 45 Envtl. L. Rep. 10116, 10120-21 (2015).
24
See Application of Business Associations for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action Pending Appellate Review
at 10-11, 16-17, West Virginia v. E.P.A., No. 15A773 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Business Associations’ Stay
Application]; States’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 15-21; Utilities’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 11-12;
Groten, supra note 23, at 10122.
25
See, e.g., States’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 15.
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Judicial review will hinge on the Court’s application of the Chevron doctrine,26 as both
issues involve EPA’s interpretation of the CAA. Under Chevron, a court must defer to an
agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute if Congress’ intent is ambiguous. With regards to
the drafting error, opponents of the CPP argue that the version of § 111 (d) drafted by the House
should govern, and that it unambiguously precludes the regulation of CO2 from power plants, 27
whereas the EPA argues that the House version is ambiguous, but can be reasonably interpreted
so as not to conflict with the Senate version, which does not prohibit the CPP.28 Consequently, a
reviewing court will likely be forced to determine whether the House version is ambiguous under
Chevron step one in order to resolve this issue.

The fenceline issue involves the EPA’s

interpretation of the terms “best system of emission reduction” (“BSER”), which comprises the
statutory basis for calculating the CPP’s emissions standards.29 Opponents challenge the EPA’s
interpretation as being overly expansive, whereas the EPA argues that outside the fenceline
measures are authorized under the plain meaning of the term “system,” as well as the legislative
history and overall structure of the CAA.30 Resolving this issue will implicate Chevron to some
degree. Though the EPA argues that its interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the
statute,31 the Court could very well invoke Chevron step two, as “system” is not defined within
the CAA, and “best system of emission reduction” lacks a clear meaning.32 Alternatively, recent
cases suggest the Court’s willingness to deny Chevron deference, under what is known as the
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major questions canon, when determining issues of “vast economic and political significance.”33
Those challenging the CPP argue that the EPA’s interpretation of BSER is not entitled to
deference due to the economic significance of the agency’s attempt to restructure the energy
sector.34
This Comment assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments on both sides of
these two crucial issues, and argues that the CPP ought to survive them. In particular, the
arguments in favor of reading § 111(d) to preclude the CPP are relatively weak, and under
Chevron, a court should defer to the EPA’s interpretation. Furthermore, interpreting § 111(d) to
allow regulations beyond the fenceline is reasonable under Chevron step two. Finally, the major
questions canon should not be applied to invalidate the CPP. The rule lacks a convincing
rationale and the Court has not defined the criteria for administering it. Moreover, recent cases
in which the doctrine was applied are distinguishable from the context of the CPP.
II.

Statutory Background

In order to implement the CPP, EPA relies on its authority under § 111(d) of the CAA.
Section 111 was originally conceived as part of a “three-legged” approach to regulating air
pollutants emitted from stationary sources. 35 Accordingly, §§ 107-110 of the CAA address
“criteria pollutants,” “the presence of which in the ambient air results from numerous or diverse
mobile or stationary sources,” and which “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.” 36 In addition, § 112 addresses “hazardous air pollutants” (“HAPs”) by
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Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014). See also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480,
2489 (2015); Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).
34
See Utilities’s Stay Application, supra note 23, at 11; Business Associations’ Stay Application, supra note 24 at
10-11; Coal Industry Stay Application, supra note 23, at 3; States’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 15.
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36
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establishing national emissions standards that for a list of designated pollutants that apply to a
list of source categories.37 In light of these provisions, § 111 was originally conceived as a gapfiller that would cover emissions of non-criteria, non-HAP pollutants that the EPA determined
caused or contributed to “air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.” 38 In particular, § 111(b) addresses emissions from new sources, while §
111(d) covers existing sources.39 Existing sources within a particular category are subject to §
111(d) only if new sources of the same category are already regulated under § 111(b).
Section 111(d) authorizes regulations on a state-wide level.40 To accomplish this, the
EPA establishes a “standard of performance for any existing source for any air pollutant.”41 The
Act defines a “standard of performance” as “a standard for emissions of air pollutants which
reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of
emission reduction which . . . the Administrator determines has been adequately
demonstrated.”42 Thus, to establish a standard of performance, the EPA identifies the BSER for a
given air pollutant and source category and the emission reduction that would result from the
implementation of that system.43 States are then required to develop a plan that would meet or
exceed the emissions reductions achievable under the BSER. 44 Under § 111(d), States may
choose the method of achieving emissions reductions, but if a state plan fails to provide for the
implementation or enforcement of standards that meet EPA guidelines, the EPA has the authority

37

42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2012); Robert R. Nordhaus & Avi Zevin, Historical Perpectives on § 111(d) of the
Clean Air Act, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 11095, 11097 (2014).
39
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to substitute its own plan.45 Because fossil-fuel fired power plants are a listed source category
and greenhouse gases are not defined as a criteria or hazardous pollutant,46 the EPA is relying on
§ 111(d) for authority to implement the CPP, including the methods for emissions reduction
suggested by the three building blocks.
III.

Chevron

In 1984, the Supreme issued its landmark ruling in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council. At issue was the EPA’s interpretation of the term “stationary
source” in the context of one of the CAA’s permitting requirements, which treated all of the
pollution-emitting devices within a single industrial facility as though they were encased in a
single “bubble.”47 Meanwhile, the Respondents argued that each individual pollution-emitting
source constituted a discrete stationary source so long as it emitted over 100 tons of a pollutant.48
To resolve this dispute, the Majority announced the following rule: “If the intent of Congress is
clear . . . the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress. If however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue . . . the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”49
Applying this framework, the Majority noted that because the relevant provision of the
CAA did not contain a definition of stationary source, the term’s meaning was unclear.50 Next,
the Majority assessed the legislative history of the provision, and found that it too was unhelpful
45

See § 7411(d)(2)(A); Carbonell & Ceronsky, supra note 2, at 11087-11088.
See §§ 7411(d)(1)(A)(i), 7412(b)(1); EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards (2016) available at
http://www3.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/criteria.html.
47
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
48
See id.at 859.
49
Id. at 843.
50
See id. at 860.
46
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in clarifying the meaning of the term. 51 However, the Majority did find that the legislative
history clearly established the policy goals of the statute, and it upheld EPA’s interpretation
because the agency had reasonably concluded that the plant-wide definition of stationary source
was consistent with the intended policy.52
Chevron’s two-step framework is now considered “foundational,” as the “undisputed
starting point for any assessment of the allocation of authority between federal courts and
administrative agencies.”53 Its central holding has been interpreted to mean that when a legal
challenge involves an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute, the reviewing court
must determine whether Congress has unambiguously expressed its intent (step one).54 If not,
the Court must defer to any interpretation that is reasonable in light of the statute, its history, and
the canons of statutory construction (step two).55 This approach resulted in a major transfer of
interpretive authority to agencies.56 Prior to Chevron, judicial interpretation was the default rule.
Deference to administrative agencies required special justification, and the amount of deference
was determined on a sliding scale.57 Thus, Chevron’s two-step framework was revolutionary;

51

See id. at 862.
See id. at 863.
53
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006).
54
Chevron’s applicability may be limited according to certain “step zero” considerations, which are not discussed in
this Comment. See id at 207-22.
55
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its
legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.” internal citations
omitted). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 977 (1992).
56
See Merrill, supra note 55, at 977. The extent to which Chevron shifts the balance of interpretive authority away
from courts is often be limited in several ways. First, the application of step one has been described as “erratic” with
some courts finding ambiguity far less often than others. See "How Clear Is Clear" in Chevron's Step One?, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 1687, 191-92 (2005). Second, the Supreme Court has limited the contexts in which Chevron applies
at all. See Sunstein, supra note 53. This Comment discusses one of these limiting principles, the major questions
canon.
57
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because once a reviewing court finds an ambiguity, it must automatically give maximum
deference to the agency and accept any reasonable interpretation.58
The Chevron Majority framed this rule in terms of an implicit Congressional delegation
of authority to the executive. That is, Chevron relies on the assumption that by conferring
authority to administer a statute to an agency, Congress implicitly delegates interpretive
authority.59 This rationale relies on a legal fiction, which assumes that a hypothetical reasonable
legislator intended agencies rather than courts to resolve statutory ambiguities.60 The Majority’s
opinion in Chevron suggests two justifications for finding an implicit delegation. First, the
Majority notes that “the regulatory scheme is technical and complex,” and suggests that
Congress may have wanted agencies “with great expertise and charged with responsibility for
administering the provision” to resolve any ambiguities. 61 Second, the Majority notes that
agency interpretations involve policy choices, which are more appropriately left to agencies
because they democratically accountable, whereas the judiciary is not.62
The twin rationales for the Chevron framework inform the manner in which courts should
apply the doctrine at step one. The task of determining whether a statute is ambiguous requires

58

See id.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (noting that “sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency . . . is implicit . . . .
In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.”); Merrill, supra note 55, at 995.
60
See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 200; Abigail R. Moncreiff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to
Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got it Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L.
REV. 593, 608-09. This has been referred to as the “delegation” theory of Chevron, which appears to be the
prevailing theory of the case amongst the Justices on the Supreme Court. See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 198.
61
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
62
See id. at 865-66 (“[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its
judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolve by the agency
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”). See also Sunstein, supra note 53, at
197.
59
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courts to apply, explicitly or implicitly, some standard of clarity.63 In finding the appropriate
standard, commentators have suggested that courts should be guided by the underlying
justification for Chevron itself.64 This makes sense, given that step one determines whether or
not deference should apply. If the underlying justifications for deference are present, then a
court should be more willing to find statutory ambiguity than it otherwise would be. Although
courts may apply step one inconsistently in practice,65 this Comment will assume that political
accountability and agency expertise count in favor of finding ambiguity for the purposes of its
analysis.
A. Chevron and the Major Questions Exception
The implicit delegation rationale serves as the basis for the major questions canon, which
has been invoked to invalidate agency interpretations that are analyzed under Chevron.
Commentators view FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. as the first mature expression
of the doctrine. 66 At issue was the FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA to include tobacco
products.67 The Majority rejected this interpretation, finding that it was inconsistent with the
intent of Congress, as expressed via the FDCA’s “overall regulatory scheme” and subsequent
legislation involving tobacco. 68

More specifically, the Majority found that the FDA’s

interpretation was not consistent with the term “safety” as it was used throughout the FDCA.69
In addition, the Majority determined that if tobacco products were subject to the FDCA, they

63

See "How Clear Is Clear" in Chevron's Step One?, supra note 56, at 1698.
See id. at 1701-03.
65
See id. at 1691-92.
66
See Sunstien, supra note 53, at 240; Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 601.
67
See Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000).
68
See id.
69
See id. at 160.
64
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would have to be banned according to the terms of the statute.70 Yet, the Majority reasoned,
Congress “has foreclosed the removal of tobacco products from the market,” insofar as it has
“directly addressed the problem of tobacco and health through legislation on six occasions since
1965.” 71 The Majority interpreted these enactments as a ratification of the FDA’s previous
position that it lacked the jurisdiction to regulate tobacco, 72 and it concluded that Congress
clearly intended to preclude the FDA from regulating tobacco products.73
Brown & Williamson is notable for the manner in which it deploys Chevron step one. At
the outset, the Majority indicated that it was invalidating the FDA’s interpretation because it was
inconsistent with the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”74 This would seem to be a
straightforward application of the first step yet, towards the end of the opinion, the Majority
again addressed Chevron, this time discussing its applicability in general, noting that “in
extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has
intended . . . an implicit delegation.”75 To support this proposition the Majority cited a passage
from an essay authored by Justice Breyer in 1986, a time when Chevron’s scope remained a
topic of debate.76 In that essay, then-Judge Breyer suggests the following: “A court may also ask
whether the legal question is an important one. Congress is more likely to have focused upon,
and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the
course of the statute’s daily administration.”77 On this basis, the Majority concluded: “we are

70

See id. at 137,
Id. at 137
72
See id. at 156.
73
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161.
74
Id. at 125-26.
75
Id. at 159.
76
See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 199.
77
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.
71
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confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and
political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”78
Since Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court has invoked the major questions canon
on several occasions. Most recently, in King v. Burwell, the Court denied deference to the IRS’
interpretation of the Affordable Care Act. That case involved an interpretation governing tax
credits for individuals who purchased health care on a federal exchange, as opposed to an
exchange established by one of the states.79 Rather than apply Chevron, the Majority held that
because the tax credits involved “billions of dollars in spending each year,” and affected “the
price of health insurance for millions of people,” the interpretive issue was a “question of deep
economic and political significance.” 80 Consequently, the Majority concluded that it was
“especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no
expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”81
In another recent case, UARG, the Majority stressed that the major questions canon was
appropriate in the context of an expansion of agency authority that would have vast economic
and political significance. In that case, the Majority invalidated an EPA interpretation of the
CAA’s permitting requirements as applied to GHG emissions. The Majority was concerned that
forcing stationary sources to acquire permits on the basis of GHG emissions would result in an
absurd expansion of the number of sources that would be subject to the program.82 Specifically,
it noted that under the EPA’s interpretation, the agency could require permits for “the
construction and modification of tens of thousands, and the operation of millions, of small
78

Id. at 160.
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2427, 2488 (2015).
80
Id. at 2489.
81
Id..
82
See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2428 (2014)
79
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sources nationwide.” 83 Consequently, citing Brown & Williamson, it concluded that EPA’s
interpretation was unreasonable within the framework of Chevron step two because it would
result in “an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear
congressional authorization.”84
Taken together, these cases illustrate two problems with the major questions canon, one
theoretical and the other practical. First, it appears to function as a broad exception to Chevron.
In Brown & Williamson, the Majority discussed the economic and political significance of the
FDA’s interpretation after it had concluded that the statute was unambiguous under Chevron step
one.85 In UARG, the majority invoked the major questions canon at step two, as a basis for
concluding that the EPA’s interpretation was unreasonable.86 Finally, the King majority never
embarked on a Chevron analysis, and simply announced that the framework does not apply.87
Consequently, the doctrine is not confined to any particular “step,” but operates as a mechanism
for denying deference on issues deemed sufficiently important.
But it is unclear why courts should assume interpretive authority over major questions.
As several commentators have observed, the major questions canon lacks a persuasive
justification in light of the two widely accepted justifications for Chevron—technical expertise
83

Id. at 2444.
Id.
85
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160.
86
See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (“EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable because . . . .”).
87
See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89. There is debate as to whether the major questions canon should be interpreted as
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Congress’ intent is unambiguous. See Sunstien, supra note 53, at 247. Others interpret the major questions canon as
a broad exception to Chevron. See Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 603. The difference may be more theoretical than
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and political accountability.88 If, as Chevron suggests, courts should defer to agencies because
they possess more technical expertise than judges, and because policy decisions are best
determined by politically accountable branches of government, then Chevron should apply to
economically and politically significant issues as well. In King, the Majority indicates that it is
concerned with technical expertise, and its rationale for invoking the major questions canon is
that the IRS is the wrong agency for determining health care policy. 89 But in UARG the Majority
suggests a different rationale, which is that courts should assume interpretive authority when an
agency attempts to enlarge its own jurisdiction.90 But conceptualizing the major questions canon
in terms of a rule against agency self-aggrandizement also lacks a compelling justification in
light of Chevron. This is because agency interpretations that result in broader authority also
involve technical expertise and political accountability.

Thus, assuming that an agency’s

rulemaking was motivated purely out of a bad faith desire for increased power, it would still be
subject to political forces that would force it to develop “compelling technical and political
reasons for [its] decisions.”91
Another problem with the major questions canon is that there is no criterion for
administering the doctrine. In each major questions case, the Court simply relies on the phrase
“economic and political significance” without explaining where the line is drawn. For instance,
the King Majority cites the fact that the ACA tax credits constituted “billions of dollars in
spending” and affected “millions of people.92 But what if it only involved millions in spending
and affected thousands of people, would the major questions canon still apply? The Court leaves
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this question unanswered. 93 Moreover, the apparent source of the doctrine, Justice Breyer’s
essay, also fails to address the issue.94 Breyer himself has indicated that he viewed “majorness”
as one of several factors that would determine how much deference a court would apply.95
IV.

Legal Challenges

This Comment addresses two arguments that are likely to figure prominently in the legal
challenge against the CPP. First, a reviewing court will be forced to answer the threshold
question of whether § 112 precludes regulation of existing sources under § 111(d). This will
require judicial review of a longstanding drafting error, which will be an issue of first
impression.96 Second, recent decisions involving EPA interpretations of the CAA suggest that
the “fenceline” issue will play a major role in a challenge before the Supreme Court, as at least
four Justices have expressed concern over the breadth of EPA’s statutory authority to regulate air
pollutants.97 In addition, EPA’s asserted authority to regulate beyond the fenceline constitutes
the central premise of the CPP as well as an unprecedented expansion of regulatory power with
respect to air pollution and GHG’s in particular. Consequently, the resolution of this issue will
likely have a lasting impact on future EPA action under the CAA.
A. The Drafting Error Argument
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In 1990, Congress amended the CAA and passed two different, potentially conflicting
versions of § 111(d).98 Prior to the 1990 amendments, § 111(d)(1) applied to “any air pollutant
for which air quality criteria have not been issued or which is not included on a list published
under section 108(a) or 112(b)(1)(a).” 99 Consistent with § 111(d)’s role as a gap-filler for
pollutants that were not covered by the criteria pollutant and HAP programs, this language was
interpreted to exclude three categories of air pollutants: those for which air quality criteria have
not been issued, those listed in § 108(a), and those listed in § 112(b)(1)(a).100 In amending this
provision in 1990, the Senate merely updated the cross-reference to reflect changes to § 112,
substituting “§ 112” for “§ 112(b)(1)(a).”101 Meanwhile the House version contains the language
that currently appears in the U.S. Code:102 “for any air pollutant for which air quality criteria
have not been issued or which is not included on a list published under [§ 108(a)] of this title or
emitted from a source category which is regulated under [§ 112] of this title.”103
Opponents of the CPP argue that the House version precludes the EPA from regulating
CO2 emissions from power plants under § 111(d). On this view, the language of the House
version is unambiguous, and by its plain meaning § 111(d)(1) explicitly excludes pollutants
regulated under § 108(a) as well as any air pollutant emitted from a source category regulated
under § 112. 104 Opponents also argue that this interpretation is consistent with the 1990
amendments, which revised § 112 to authorize regulations according to source categories rather
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than pollutants.105 As a result of this change, opponents contend that § 111(d)(1) was similarly
amended to exclude § 112 source categories rather than pollutants, so as to avoid subjecting
existing sources to simultaneous national and state-wide standards under §§ 112 and 111(d),
respectively.106 Because § 112 authorizes the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, which apply to
power plants, this reading of the House version would invalidate the CPP.107
In addition, proponents of this view argue that Congress never intended to pass the
Senate version of § 111(d). In the absence of any legislative history clarifying the intended
scope of the § 111(d) exception,108 opponents of the CPP rely on the textual structure of the 1990
amendments. Accordingly, they note that the House version appears among several substantive
changes to the Act, whereas the Senate version is included among a list of “clerical” changes
under the heading “Conforming Amendments.” 109 The Senate Legislative Drafting Manual
stipulates that conforming amendments are “necessitated by the substantive amendments or
provisions of the bill.” 110 Thus, the Senate version, which replaces “112(b)(1)(A)” with
“112(b),” 111 corresponds with the need to update the cross-reference to § 112 in light of
substantive amendments made to that section.112 Yet, the House version also replaces this crossreference, substituting “112(b)(1)(A)” with “or emitted from a source category which is
regulated under section 112.”113 In light of this conflict, opponents of the CPP argue that the
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Drafter’s intended to pass the House version because a conforming amendment would never be
intended to qualify a substantive amendment. 114 Consequently, they argue that the Senate
version was included in the final draft of the amendments by mistake, and should not be given
effect.115
Alternatively, opponents also argue that even if a court were to consider the Senate
version, it should give effect to both provisions and interpret them to exclude — in addition to
criteria pollutants—both any HAP emitted from any source and any air pollutant emitted from a
source category regulated under § 112. 116 Opponents contend that principles of statutory
construction require a court to give maximum effect to the language in each provision, and that
therefore this reading constitutes the only permissible interpretation of both provisions. 117
Moreover, proponents argue that because the 1990 amendments expanded the scope of § 112,
this interpretation is consistent with the overall structure of the Act insofar as it narrows the gap
covered by § 111(d).118
Unsurprisingly, the EPA rejects both of these arguments and takes the position that §
111(d) authorizes the regulation of CO2 from power plants. Instead, the agency gives effect to
both versions of the 1990 amendments and construes them as having the same meaning within
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the House Office of the Law Revision Counsel, resolved this conflict by applying the amendments in the order in
which they appear. See id. at 30-31 (noting that Congress and the House Office of the Law Revision Counsel have
established a rule whereby an amendment will not be included in the U.S. Code if “a prior amendment in the same
bill removes or alters the text that the subsequent amendment would amend.”). Accordingly, because the crossreference to § 112 had already been deleted by operation of the prior amendment containing the House version, the
Senate version “could not be executed” and was not included in the U.S. Code. See id.(quoting the Office’s
amendment note).
115
See Murray Energy States’ Brief, supra note 112.
116
See id. at 14-15.
117
See id. at 13.
118
See Groten, supra note 23, at 10121 (noting that Congress completely rewrote § 112, adding a list of 188 HAPs
to regulate).
114

19

the context of the CPP.119 Accordingly, the EPA argues that the Senate version is clear and
unambiguous, and that its plain meaning excludes regulation of pollutants that are listed in §
112.120 With regards to the House version, the EPA argues that the language is ambiguous, and
that in light of the CAA’s history and structure, the only reasonable interpretation is that it
excludes air pollutants listed in § 112 that are also emitted from source categories regulated
under § 112.121 On this reading, the § 111(d) exclusion does not preclude the CPP, because CO2
is not a HAP subject to § 112.122
Whereas opponents of the CPP assume that the House version’s language is clear, the
EPA’s position suggests that it should be entitled to deference under Chevron step two. 123 To
support this view, the EPA argues that the House version is susceptible to numerous
interpretations.124 To illustrate, recall that § 111(d)(1) provides as follows:
“The Administrator shall shall prescribe regulations . . . under which each
State shall submit to the Administrator a plan which establishes standards of
performance for any existing source for any air pollutant [clause 1] for which air
quality criteria have not been issued or [clause 2] which is not included on a list
published under [§ 108(a)] of this title or [clause 3] emitted from a source
category which is regulated under [§ 112] of this title.”125

Opponents of the CPP read the three clauses as simultaneous requirements, such that § 111(d)
only applies to air pollutants that meet all three conditions. This reading imputes a conjunctive
relationship between the three clauses, effectively replacing each “or” with an “and.” Yet, as
EPA and others have noted,126 the disjunctive “or” that connects each clause supports a literal
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interpretation that allows the EPA to regulate any air pollutant when either air quality criteria
have not been established for that pollutant or the pollutant is either not listed in § 108(a) or not
emitted from a source category listed in § 112. On this reading, § 111(d) would authorize the
EPA to regulate any air pollutant for which air quality criteria have not been issued, regardless of
whether it is subject to regulation under § 112.127
The plain text of the House version also supports an interpretation that expressly
authorizes the regulation of air pollutants that are emitted from a source category that is subject
to § 112. Unlike the first two clauses which are stated in the negative (“for which air quality
criteria have not been issued . . . which is not on a list published under [§ 108(a)]”), the third
clause is stated in the positive. Opponents of the CPP rely on an interpretation of the House
version that implicitly repeats the negative from clause 2, reading clause 3 as “which is not
emitted from a source category which is regulated under § 112,” to conclude that § 111(d)
prohibits rather than authorizes the regulation of pollutants emitted from § 112 source categories.
But as the EPA points out, this interpretation relies on a presumption, not the plain text of the
House version.128
Because the plain text of the House version supports multiple readings, the EPA argues
that it is ambiguous. 129 Thus, in anticipation of Chevron step two, the EPA advances an
interpretation that does not preclude the CPP, which the agency argues is reasonable in light of §
111(d)’s purpose as a gap-filler covering non-criteria, non-HAP pollutants.

The EPA’s

definition diverges from the plain text of the House version in the same manner as its opponents’
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interpretation, construing the three clauses as conjunctives, and reading a negative “which is not”
in to the third clause.130 However, unlike its opponents, the EPA does not read the “emitted from
a source category which is regulated under [§ 112] as a broad exclusion of source categories
listed under § 112 regardless of the pollutant subject to regulation under § 111(d). 131 Instead, the
EPA argues that “regulated under [§ 112]” only refers to HAP emissions.132 Therefore, when
“regulated under [§ 112] modifies “source categories,” it means that source categories listed
under § 112 are excluded when the pollutant subject to § 111(d) regulation is also a HAP listed
in § 112.133 In this manner, the EPA reads the House version as a similar, but more narrow
exclusion than the Senate version. Whereas the Senate version excludes pollutants that are listed
under § 112, the EPA argues that the House version should be read to exclude § 112 pollutants
emitted from § 112 source categories.134
The EPA argues that this reading is reasonable because it is consistent with the structure
of the Act and Congress’ intent. First, the EPA notes that because “emitted from a source
category which is regulated under [§ 112]” modifies “any air pollutant,” it makes more sense to
interpret the clause as an exclusion of pollutants rather than source categories. 135 Second, the
EPA argues that its interpretation is consistent with the structure of the CAA because it does not
leave a regulatory gap for harmful pollutants that are not regulated under the criteria or HAP
programs.136 By contrast, the alternative interpretation adopted by the opponents of the CPP
would prevent the EPA from regulating harmful non-criteria, non-HAP pollutants emitted from a
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source category that is subject to regulation under § 112.137 But, the EPA argues, there is no
evidence to suggest that Congress intended to narrow § 111(d) coverage when it passed the 1990
amendments.138 Finally, because the EPA recognizes both versions of § 111(d), it argues that its
interpretation of the House version is reasonable because it is consistent with the Senate
version.139
B. Resolving the Drafting Error Argument
Ultimately, because the dispute involves an agency’s interpretation of a statute, the
drafting error issue hinges on a court’s application of Chevron. If a reviewing court determines
that Congress did not intend to pass the Senate amendment to § 111(d), it will still have to
determine whether the House version is ambiguous, as the EPA argues. Otherwise, a court may
determine that it must give effect to both versions. 140 In this event, opponents of the CPP argue
that the Senate version should be ‘added’ to their interpretation of the House version to create a
broader exclusion that combines the two provisions. On the other hand, the EPA argues that the
two versions are consistent with one another. Consequently, to address each side’s arguments, a
reviewing court will have to resolve the meaning of the House version regardless of whether it
decides to give effect to the Senate version.
1. The House Amendment Is Ambiguous
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A reviewing court should find that the House version of § 111(d) is ambiguous. First, as
the EPA points out, the most natural reading of the text does not make sense in light of the
statute’s purpose as a gap-filler. Because the natural reading of the word “or” results in a series
of disjunctive conditions, the text of the House amendment suggests that § 111(d) applies to any
pollutant for which air quality criteria have not been established or which is either not listed in §
108(a) or not emitted from a source category listed in § 112. Yet this construction conflicts with
the purpose of the exclusion, as both sides agree that § 111(d) was intended to cover the
regulatory gaps between §§ 108 and 112 without overlapping with those programs. 141 If “or” is
allowed to have its natural meaning, then the House version of § 111(d) would allow overlapping
regulations of pollutants covered by § 108(a) (if either air quality criteria have not been
established, or if the pollutant is not emitted by a § 112 source category) as well as pollutants
emitted from a source category listed in § 112 (if either air quality criteria have not been
established, or if the pollutant is not listed in § 108(a)).
In addition to finding textual evidence of ambiguity, a court should also analyze the step
one issue in terms of institutional choice. In this regard, the court must consider whether it
makes sense to assume that a rational legislator would have intended the EPA to have
interpretive authority over the CAA. Of course, Chevron itself answers this question to some
extent. As the Court recognized in that case, the EPA should be entitled to deference when
interpreting a complex statute within its area of expertise. More specifically, the Court has
already recognized the EPA as “expert agency” with regards to the regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions. 142 Moreover, although the EPA is an independent agency, 143 the CPP is a clear
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reflection of executive branch policymaking, in that it was promulgated at the president’s
request. Thus, the EPA’s attendant interpretations of the CAA reflect policy choices that were
made by a politically accountable branch of government. On the bases of agency expertise and
political accountability, a reviewing court’s standard of clarity should be relatively stringent, in
favor of deference. Therefore, given the textual difficulties inherent in the House version of §
111(d), as well as the rationale for deference under Chevron, a reviewing court should conclude
that it is ambiguous and analyze the EPA’s interpretation under Chevron step two.
Alternatively, it is possible that a reviewing court will apply Chevron in a manner that
recognizes the dueling amendments at the outset, rather than proceeding to analyze the House
amendment for ambiguity first. In this case, the analysis at step one is more straightforward: the
mere fact that the 1990 amendments included two potentially conflicting versions of the same
statutory text is itself sufficient evidence that Congress failed to speak clearly on the issue. Thus,
by giving effect to the Senate version, a reviewing court should recognize that the
inconsistencies between the two versions creates ambiguity.
This possibility presupposes a court’s willingness to recognize the Senate version –
something which the CPP’s opponents strenuously object to. But, it is settled law that when the
two conflict, the Statutes at Large take precedence over the U.S. Code.144 Moreover, opponents
of the CPP have no basis for assuming that the Senate did not intend to pass their version of §
111(d) simply because they inserted the updated cross-reference as a conforming amendment

"How Clear Is Clear" in Chevron's Step One?, supra note 56, at 1701 (noting Justice Kagan’s position that less
deference should be accorded for independent agencies on the political accountability justification of the Chevron
doctrine).
144
See United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 98 n.4 (1964) (citing Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426
(1943) “the Code cannot prevail over the Statutes at Large when the two are inconsistent.”).
143

25

following the House version.145 Consequently, there is no reason why a court should ignore the
Senate version.
2. The EPA’s Interpretation of the House Amendment is Reasonable
Assuming a reviewing court gets to step two, it should find that the EPA’s interpretation
of the House amendment to § 111(d) is reasonable. First, the agency’s reading is faithful to the
exclusion’s pre-1990 purpose. That is, unlike the competing interpretation, which would create a
wholesale exclusion for specific source categories, it would limit § 111(d)’s applicability to noncriteria and non-HAP pollutants.

Thus, the EPA’s interpretation avoids creating a new

regulatory gap with regards to non-criteria, non-HAP pollutants when they are emitted from
source categories listed under § 112. Second, this reading reconciles the House and Senate
versions, and avoids creating a conflict within the statute.

In this regard, the EPA’s

interpretation is consistent with the canons of statutory construction.146
Assuming a reviewing court agrees with this analysis, it will affirm the statutory
predicate for the CAA, allowing the EPA to regulate CO2 emissions from power plants under §
111(d). Nevertheless, having cleared this threshold issue the rule faces a second compelling
challenge, this time against the scope of the EPA’s statutory authority to regulate CO2 emissions
under § 111(d).
C. The Fenceline Issue
In order to implement building block 2 and 3 and regulate beyond the fenceline, the EPA
relies on an interpretation of “standard of performance” that encompasses the entire energy grid,
145
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rather than each individual power-generating facility. According to § 111(a), a standard of
performance “reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the
best system of emission reduction.”147 Because the Act does not define “system,” the EPA has
adopted an interpretation based on the plain meaning of the term, defining it as “a set of things or
parts forming a complex whole.” 148

Accordingly, the EPA defines “system of emission

reduction” as “a set of measures that work together to reduce emissions.”149
In addition, under § 111(d)(1) a standard of performance applies for “any existing
source.” 150 Section 111(d) defines an existing source as any existing “building, structure,
facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.” 151 For the purposes of the
CPP, the EPA interprets “source” to include the owners and operators of any “building, structure,
facility, or installation for which a standard of performance is applicable.” 152 Consequently, the
EPA interprets a “system of emission reduction” as a series of measures that power plant owners
and operator may implement to meet the emissions limits set by the CPP.153
The immediate consequence of the EPA’s interpretation of § 111 is that the CPP’s
emissions standards are not limited by what is achievable through on-site improvements. As a
result, the EPA’s calculation of achievable emissions reductions anticipates measures outside of
the fenceline, such as investments in renewable energy and natural gas and purchases of
emissions credits.154 In fact, EPA concedes that no pollution control technique or process can be
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installed at an existing coal-fired plant to achieve the CPP’s emissions standards.155 Thus, the
CPP will essentially force a reduction in fossil-fuel-fired power and transform the nation’s
energy mix, reducing the amount of coal-fired power from 41% of the nation’s energy supply to
27% by 2030, with natural gas and renewables making up the difference.156
Opponents of the CPP argue that the EPA lacks the authority to regulate beyond the
fenceline for two reasons.

First, they argue that the language and structure of § 111

unambiguously precludes the EPA’s interpretation. Second, opponents argue that because of the
scope of the mandated reductions in coal-fired power output, the CPP invokes a “major
question” of vast “economic and political significance” without clear authorization from
Congress.
The first argument focuses on the EPA’s conflation of sources with their owners and
operators. Section 111 defines the term “owner or operator” separately from “existing source”
and “stationary source.”157 Moreover, § 111(d) explicitly authorizes performance standards “for
any existing source,” making no mention of a source’s owners or operators.158 The Act further
distinguishes between sources and their owners and operators in § 111(e), which provides that “it
shall be unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source to operate such source in violation
of any standard of performance applicable to such source.”159 Thus, opponents of the CPP argue
that EPA’s interpretation conflicts with the unambiguous meaning of the statute because
Congress intended to classify sources and their owners and operators separately, by providing
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those terms with distinct meanings, and addressing each separately in various provisions of §
111.160
The second argument against EPA’s attempts to regulate beyond the fenceline invokes
the “major questions” doctrine.

Challengers assert that the CPP constitutes a radical and

unprecedented expansion of the EPA’s authority into an area where it lacks expertise,
transforming the agency into an energy regulator intent on reconfiguring the nation’s energy
supply.161 Consequently, invoking King and UARG, they argue that the CPP involves a major
question of economic and political significance, and that the EPA has acted without a clear
Congressional mandate, thereby overstepping the bounds of its authority under § 111.162
For its part, the EPA maintains that Congress did speak clearly when it authorized the
agency to determine the “best system of emissions reduction” for existing sources. 163 According
to the EPA, the expansive plain meaning of “system” encompasses the beyond-the-fenceline
measures implicated in building blocks 2 and 3. 164 Furthermore, the EPA maintains that its
interpretation is reasonable because on-site improvements would either be too expensive or
ineffective in curbing CO2 emissions.165 Finally, the EPA points out that power plants already
rely on generation-shifting and other off-site measures to comply with existing CAA regulations
that regulate beyond the fenceline.166
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In addition, the EPA argues that it is reasonable to include owners and operators within
the definition of “source,” out of practical necessity. This is because pollution control strategies
must always be carried out by a plant’s owner or operator, regardless of whether they occur
within the boundaries of the physical plant. 167 Thus, the agency argues, just like any other
pollution-control efforts, generation-shifting measures must be implemented by owners and
operators of the affected source.
D. Resolving The Fenceline Issue
Once again, both of the arguments marshalled by challengers to the CPP against the
EPA’s authority to regulate beyond the fenceline implicate the Chevron doctrine. The textual
argument against conflating sources with their owners or operators implicitly relies on Chevron
step one, because it asserts that the EPA’s interpretation is contrary to the unambiguous meaning
of § 111. Similarly, by invoking the “major questions” doctrine and the EPA’s lack of expertise
in energy regulation, opponents of the CPP seek to disqualify an interpretation of § 111 that
would allow measures implemented outside of the physical boundaries of an affected power
plant. Curiously, unlike its response to the drafting error argument, the EPA does not explicitly
argue that the relevant provisions of the Act are ambiguous. This suggests that the EPA is
staking its claim at Chevron step one, and implicitly asserting that building blocks 2 and 3 are
consistent with the unambiguous meaning of the Act. It is possible that a reviewing court will
accept this view and resolve the fenceline issue at step one; however, the scope of “best system
of emission reduction” has never been analyzed under Chevron.168 It is not inconceivable that a
standards promulgated under § 111(b), for which the EPA determined that the “best system” should take into
account third-party off-site fuel cleaning).
167
See id. at 44 (arguing that “buildings, structures, facilities, and installations, obviously are incapable of taking
such steps on their own.” (internal citations omitted)).
168
See Freeman, supra note 32, at 12.
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court will find the term ambiguous and analyze the fenceline issue under Chevron step two.169 If
this were to happen, the EPA might still lose a legal challenge despite being able to demonstrate
the reasonableness of its interpretations, if challengers can convince the court that building
blocks 2 and 3 raise a “major question” of economic and political significance, without clear
Congressional authorization.
1. The Plain Meaning of “Best System of Emission Reduction” Permits
Regulating Beyond the Fenceline
Within the context of § 111, the meaning of “best system” is less nebulous than it appears
on its own. For instance, the Act provides that the EPA must evaluate the costs, non-airpollution-related health and environmental impacts, and energy requirements of any proposed
emissions standard to determine whether it is “best.”170 Moreover, § 111(a)(1) stipulates that the
“best system” must be “adequately demonstrated” and “achievable.”171
Within this framework, beyond the fenceline emissions reduction strategies like
generation-shifting and emissions credit trading make sense for a number of reasons. First, the
CPP’s emissions targets meet the statutory criteria for “best.” Greater reliance on natural gas and
renewables will not have a net negative impact on public health or the environment. 172 In
addition, the EPA concluded that limiting the performance standard to what is achievable

See id. at 13 (noting that a reviewing court might find “best system” ambiguous); Carlson & Herzog, supra note
17, at 35 (predicting that a reviewing court will analyze the fenceline issue at step two).
170
See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (“[T]aking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality
health and environmental impact and energy requirements.”).
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Id.
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See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64721 (noting that the D.C. Circuit’s has interpreted “best” to mean that a rule
must not do more harm than good in terms of public health and the environment); See id. at 64751 (concluding that
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through on-site improvements would either be too costly or ineffective.173 By regulating beyond
the fenceline, the EPA aims to reduce the energy sector’s CO2 emissions by 16%, at a cost that
does not exceed prior rules promulgated for power plants under the Act. 174 In addition, the EPA
determined that there was sufficient unused natural gas and renewable generation capacity, such
that generation-shifting would not negatively impact the energy supply. 175 Second, the EPA
found that the displacement of coal and other fossil fuels in favor of natural gas and renewables
was “achievable” in light of the available capacity and prevailing trend towards greater reliance
on natural gas and renewables within the industry.176 Finally, the EPA concluded that building
blocks 2 and 3 are “adequately demonstrated” because power plants currently have the capacity
to invest in alternative fuel sources in order to reduce emissions, 177 if they do not do so
already.178 Thus, a court should find that the pollution-reduction measures anticipated by the
three building blocks are authorized under the plain meaning of “best system of emission
reduction” as that term is used in § 111.
In addition, the conflation of sources with their owners and operators does not violate the
meaning of § 111. Instead, the EPA has merely recognized the practical reality that inanimate
“stationary sources”— as that term is defined in § 111(a)—are incapable of actually
implementing any type of pollution control measure themselves, whether it be inside or outside
the fenceline. Thus, although challengers are correct to note the manner in which the statute
173
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distinguishes “owners and operators” and “source,” their argument is ultimately specious; any
emissions standard promulgated under § 111 necessarily relies on actions taken by source
owners and operators for compliance.

This is why § 111(e) holds owners and operators

responsible for implementing the standards formulated under § 111(d).
2. Building Blocks 2 and 3 Are Reasonable in Light of Congressional
Intent And Past Rulemaking
Assuming a court finds the term “best system of emission reduction” ambiguous, it
should affirm building blocks 2 and 3 because they are consistent with congressional intent and
prior regulations under the Act.

When Congress amended the CAA in 1977, it explicitly

recognized that regulations promulgated under § 111 would impact the energy sector.179 This
trend has continued, as the 1990 amendments added the HAPs provisions to the CAA, imposing
emissions standards on both new and existing electric generating units.180 Congress therefore
anticipated that pollution reduction would affect energy production when it drafted the CAA.
Moreover, Congress has previously authorized beyond the fenceline measures within the
CAA. To address acid rain, the 1990 amendments established a cap-and-trade program for sulfur
dioxide emissions from fossil fuel-fired sources and encouraged substitution of renewable
sources. 181 When it revised § 111(a)(1) in 1977, Congress specifically provided that the
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See Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 657 F.2d 298, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the Senate and House Reports
indicated that Congress was using “a long-term lens with a broad focus on . . . environmental and energy effects of
different technological systems when it discussed section 111.”). The focus on the energy impacts of pollution
control was also apparent in the 1977 amendments to the criteria pollutant program, which shares the same federalstate implementation framework as § 111. See 42 U.S. C. § 7409(d)(2) (2012) (providing for the appointment of an
“independent scientific review committee” to, inter alia, advise on the “energy effects which may result from
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precursor to the term “best system of emission reduction”182 should be broad enough to permit
the EPA to require fuel treatment that was typically conducted offsite by third parties. 183
Although Congress updated § 111(a)(1) in 1990, it expanded the definition of “standards of
performance.” 184 Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that Congress intends § 111(d)
standards of performance to allow beyond the fenceline measures, including acts by third parties.
Finally, the Supreme Court has also acknowledged the reasonableness of certain beyond
the fenceline measures in the air pollution context. In E.P.A. v. EME Homer, the Supreme Court
recently affirmed the EPA’s interpretation of the Transport Rule—a provision of the CAA that
regulates “downwind” emissions between states—which provided for an emissions credit trading
system.185 Applying Chevron, a six-Justice Majority found that the CAA’s Transport Rule failed
to specify how the EPA should divide responsibility for nonattainment of emissions standards in
downwind states between multiple upwind polluters. 186 The Majority deferred to the EPA’s
solution, which it found efficient and equitable, and therefore reasonable.187
In light of the history of the CAA and past rulemakings, a reviewing court should not find
the EPA’s interpretation of § 111 unreasonable merely because it calls for outside the fenceline
measures or relies on the actions of third parties. Nevertheless, at this stage of the analysis, the
reasonableness of the EPA’s interpretation of “best system of emission reduction” remains an

The 1977 amendments defined “standard of performance” in terms of a “technological system of continuous
emission reduction.” The pre-1977 language (“best system of emission reduction”) was restored pursuant to the
1990 amendments. See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64765-66.
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open question, as the “major questions” doctrine looms as a general exception to deference that
can be invoked at step one or two.
3. The Fenceline Issue Does Not Raise a Major Question of Economic and
Political Significance
Even if a court decides that the it is reasonable to interpret § 111(d) as authorizing
regulations that rely on actions taken outside the fenceline, it could still invalidate the CPP on the
grounds that the extent of the mandated displacement of fossil fuel-fired power is sufficient to
raise a “major question.”

The problem with any analysis of a potential “major question”

however is that no court has ever explained where the line is drawn, in terms of economic and
political significance, between so-called “major questions” and reasonable interpretation. Yet if
precedent is any guide, the CPP should not be considered a major question. In Brown &
Williamson, the Court decided that a ban on all tobacco products was sufficiently “major.” In
Burwell, the issue involved billions of dollars, and affected the health insurance policies of
millions of Americans.188 Finally, in UARG, the Court invoked the doctrine to invalidate an
interpretation that would have brought millions of new sources under the Title V permitting
program, placing a huge administrative burden on both the EPA and businesses that are not
typically considered sources of air pollution.189 The CPP is clearly distinguishable from each of
these situations. First, the rule predominantly impacts a small sector of the U.S. economy, the
coal industry. Unlike Burwell, other than reducing air pollution, the CPP will not make a
noticeable difference in the lives of the vast majority of Americans. 190 Second, unlike Brown &
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Williamson, the regulation does not result in a total ban on any product or process; it simply
incentivizes a reduction in coal power. Third, building blocks 2 and 3 really only apply to fossilfuel fired power plants, a substantially smaller number of sources nationwide than was at issue in
UARG. 191 Finally, it is likely that the energy sector would have responded to the CPP by
substituting natural gas and renewables for fossil fuel sources even if those measures had not
been suggested in building blocks 2 and 3. This is because the mandated reductions in fossilfuel-fired power are consistent with industry trends favoring increased reliance on natural gas
and renewable energy, 192 and because displacement of fossil fuels represents the most costeffective means of achieving reductions in CO2. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the CPP
represents a major disruption of the energy sector, as many challengers suggest.
Moreover, to the extent that CPP does meet the criteria for a “major question,” as the
preceding analysis outlines, there is strong evidence that § 111(d) represents clear Congressional
authorization for the offsite measures contemplated by the CPP. This is because the history of
the Act, the legislative record, past rulemakings, and even past instances of deference to the EPA
all point to the fact that the CAA, and § 111 in particular, authorizes beyond the fenceline
measures, at least to some degree. In this regard, the situation is the complete opposite as that of
Brown & Williamson, in which Congress had repeatedly acted under the assumption that the
FDA could not regulate tobacco products.
Challengers’ arguments also fail with regards to the issue of agency expertise. The Court
has repeatedly indicated that it views the EPA as an expert agency with regards to the CAA and
191
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air pollution.193 Although opponents of the CPP argue that the EPA is overstepping it authority
and deputizing itself as an energy regulator, they fail address the fact that Congress
acknowledged the relationship between air pollution controls and the energy industry when it
drafted other provisions of the CAA. Thus, the argument that the major questions doctrine
should be invoked to deny deference to the EPA because it lacks sufficient expertise to
administer the CPP is unpersuasive.
V.

Conclusion

No discussion of the imminent legal challenge to the CPP can afford to ignore the
exigencies of the moment. When the final rule was published, many thought that the rule’s fate
would likely rest in the hands of Justice Kennedy, as the swing vote in a 5-4 decision.194 Perhaps
no one expected that the Court would grant a stay, much less that Justice Scalia would pass away
within weeks of that unprecedented decision. At the time the stay was granted, headlines
suggested that the CPP was in serious trouble,195 although no one could say exactly why; the
Court’s stay order contained no reasoning, but simply indicated that the four “liberal” Justices
had voted against it. Now, following Scalia’s demise, there is a chance that the political
obfuscation surrounding the nomination process will have the ironic effect of ensuring that the
Court cannot strike the rule.196 Right now, litigation is proceeding on an expedited schedule, and
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the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals will hear the case in early June.197 If Republicans prevent an
Obama nominee from reaching the bench, there is a chance that the challenge will be decided by
an evenly divided Supreme Court.

Thus, there is a possibility that the same Republican

obstructionism that bore the rule may ensure that it survives.
As for the actual legal analysis of the case, this Comment has outlined two issues of first
impression that constitute the bulk of challengers’ arguments against the rule. As the preceding
analysis suggests, the EPA can adduce persuasive arguments in its favor. Accordingly, the CPP
should not be precluded by the House version of § 111(d), regardless of whether a court decides
to give effect to the Senate version.

In addition, § 111(d) should be interpreted to allow

generation-shifting as well as other measures taken beyond the fenceline, as such measures are
generally recognized by all three branches of government as viable, efficient means of reducing
air pollution. Finally, the CPP does not warrant invalidation under the major questions doctrine
because it is not sufficiently disruptive in light of precedent, because it is consistent with
Congress’ vision of the CAA, and because the EPA is the expert agency tasked with regulating
air pollution pursuant to the Act. For these reasons, a reviewing court, namely the D.C. Circuit
Court, should uphold the rule.
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